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THE DELIVERY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
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ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR.
Snug Harbor Community School
This article examines legal issues surrounding the delivery of special edu-
cation to children whose parents have voluntarily enrolled them in Catholic
schools. In so doing, the article reviews the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), its regulations, and case law over the extent to
which special education must be provided, the way in which it is delivered,
and the quality of sen'ices that students in Catholic schools receive. The
final portion of the article addresses questions about the deliveiy of special
education in Catholic schools, including guidelines for implementing the
new provisions in the IDEA in a manner that avoids running afoul of the
Establishment Clause.
NOTE: 1) In this article, the authors use the term "special education" to
include both special education and related services; and 2) even though the
IDEA and its regulations actually use the terms "private" and "parochial"
schools, the authors prefer, and typically use, the terms nonpublic or reli-
giously affiliated nonpublic schools.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1999) is designedto provide a free, appropriate public education to all students with dis-
abilities in the least restrictive environment. As a federal statute, the IDEA
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clearly applies to students in public schools. However, since the IDEA, orig-
inally named the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, became law
in 1975, questions remain over whether, or to what extent, it applies to stu-
dents whose parents voluntarily enrolled them in religiously affiliated non-
public schools, most notably Catholic schools.
Following the Supreme Court's ban on the on-site delivery of remedial
Title I services in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools {Aguilar v. Felton,
1985), districts had to provide services at public schools or neutral sites.
Fortunately, from the point of view of those who are interested in Catholic
education, the landscape began to evolve when two Supreme Court cases lift-
ed the ban against the on-site delivery of services to students who attended
religiously affiliated nonpublic schools (Agostini v. Felton, 1997; Zobrest v.
Catalino Foothills School District, 1993). Additional change occurred in
1997 when Congressional reauthorization of the IDEA included provisions
further clarifying the obligations of public school systems to provide special
education and related services to students in nonpublic schools. Even so, nei-
ther Congress nor the courts conclusively answered questions about the
delivery of special education for children in religiously affiliated nonpubhc
schools. Moreover, the statutory and regulatory changes have created some-
thing of a dilemma because while, on the one hand, they make it clear that
children in religious schools are entitled to receive some special education
services, on the other hand, they contain funding restrictions that may actu-
ally mean that these children will receive fewer services.
In light of legal issues surrounding the delivery of special education to
children who attend Catholic schools, this article is divided into three parts.
The first section reviews recent changes in the law and regulations dealing
with the delivery of special education to children in nonpublic schools. The
second part reviews both pre- and post-amendment litigation on special edu-
cation in nonpublic, mostly Catholic, schools; this section highlights a case
from Louisiana, now on appeal before the Supreme Court, that challenged a
state law permitting the on-site delivery of special education in Catholic
schools. The Court's resolution of this dispute may go a long way in defin-
ing whether, and to what extent, public school systems can continue to offer
the on-site delivery of special education for children in Catholic and other
nonpublic schools. The third part addresses issues in need of further clarifi-
cation about the parameters of delivering special education to children. The
authors hope that this article will provide interested readers with an improved
understanding of case law and the regulations that will help them better pro-
vide for the delivery of special education to children who attend Catholic
schools.
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1997 IDEA AMENDMENTS
AND 1999 REGULATIONS
The 1997 IDEA Amendments unequivocally declare that students whose par-
ents voluntarily enroll them in nonpublic schools are entitled to some level of
participation in special education. However, students in nonpublic schools
may not necessarily be entitled to participate to the same level as they would
have had they been enrolled in public schools. The statutory provisions
detailing the duties of school districts to offer special education to students in
nonpublic schools are examined in the following sections.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The 1997 Amendments (IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(A)(0) indicate that public
school districts must make provisions for the participation of students with
disabilities whose parents have voluntarily enrolled them in "private
schools." The sum of money that districts spend on special education for chil-
dren in nonpublic schools must equal a proportionate amount of federal funds
made available to them under the IDEA (IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)).
Another major change in the 1997 Amendments indicates that special
education may be provided to students with disabilities on the premises of
"private" schools, including "parochial" or "sectarian" schools (IDEA §
1412(a)(10)(A)(0(II)), as long as appropriate safeguards are in place to avoid
too close a relationship between the govemment qua public school districts
and religious institutions.
REGULATIONS
In implementing the IDEA, the Department of Education released new regu-
lations. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
in March 1999. These regulations incorporate the statutory changes and offer
additional guidance on carrying out the IDEAs requirements while borrow-
ing from the pre-existing Education Department General Administrative
Regulations (EDGAR). The EDGAR regulations require school systems to
provide students in nonpublic schools with opportunities for equitable par-
ticipation in federal programs (34 C.F.R. § 76.65l(a)(l)). More specifically,
this means that students in nonpublic schools are entitled to equal opportuni-
ties to participate in federal programs that are of comparable quality to those
available to children in public schools (34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a)). In developing
such programs, public school personnel must consult with representatives of
the nonpublic schools to consider which students will be served, how their
needs will be identified, what benefits they will receive, how the benefits will
be delivered, and how the programs will be evaluated (34 C.F.R. §
76.652(a)(l)-(5)). As might have been anticipated, the original IDEA and
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EDGAR regulations have been subject to litigation over the delivery of spe-
cial education to students in religious schools. To date, the 1999 regulations
have yet to be challenged in court.
PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS DEFINED
Public school districts are responsible for locating, identifying, and evaluat-
ing all students with disabilities who attend "private schools" within their
jurisdictions, including children who attend religiously affiliated schools (34
C.F.R. § 300.451). As such, districts must develop plans to permit these stu-
dents to participate in programs carried out pursuant to the IDEA (34 C.F.R.
§ 300.452). The regulation defines students in private schools as those whose
parents have voluntarily enrolled them in such schools or facilities. However,
the definition does not include students whose districts have placed them in
private facilities at public expense in order to provide them with a free appro-
priate public education (34 C.F.R. § 300.450).
SPENDING LIMITS
Consistent with restrictions in the IDEA, there is a limit on the amount of
money that a district must spend in providing services to pupils in nonpublic
schools (34 C.F.R. § 300.453). The total is limited to a proportionate amount
of the federal funds received based on the number of students in nonpublic
schools in relation to the overall number of pupils in the district. At the same
time, districts are not prohibited from using state funds to offer more than the
IDEA calls for since the regulation only establishes a minimum amount that
they must spend on these children.
COMPARABLE SERVICES
Another regulation (34 C.F.R. § 300.454) explains that students with disabil-
ities in nonpublic schools are not entitled to the same level of services that
they would have received had they attended public schools. The regulation
gives public school officials, after consultation with representatives from
nonpublic schools, the authority to decide which students from nonpublic
schools will be served, what services they will receive, and how the services
will be delivered. The regulation emphasizes that the consultation must give
representatives from the nonpublic schools a genuine opportunity to express
their views before to any decision-making about the expenditure of funds.
Needless to say, a district has the final authority to decide which services will
be provided to eligible students in nonpublic schools.
Students in nonpublic schools are entitled to receive services that are of
comparable quality to what is offered to their peers in the public schools (34
C.F.R. § 300.455). Moreover, public school personnel who deliver services to
students in nonpublic schools must meet the same standards as their coun-
Russo, Massucci, Osbome/DELIVERY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 379
terparts in the public schools. If service providers in nonpublic schools are
certificated, they are considered to have met the same standards as public
school personnel. This regulation adds that children attending nonpublic
schools may receive a different amount of services than their public school
counterparts and that nonpublic school students are not entitled to any service
or to any amount of a service that they would have received had they been
enrolled in public schools.
Insofar as students in nonpublic schools are not entitled to a free appro-
priate public education unless they attend a public school, the regulations do
not require the development of an individualized education program (IEP).
Instead, the regulations require a district to develop a services plan describ-
ing the services that it will provide to a student (34 C.F.R. § 300.455(b)(l)).
However, the services plan must meet the IEP content requirements and must
be developed, reviewed, and revised in a manner consistent with the IEP
process (34 C.F.R. § 300.455(b)(2)).
ON-SITE DELIVERY OF SERVICES
Consistent with the language of the IDEA, the regulations reiterate that ser-
vices may be offered on-site at nonpublic schools even if they are religious-
ly affiliated (34 C.FR. § 300.456(a)). Consequently, in order to differentiate
between schools, the regulations use the term "religious school" to reflect the
fact that all religious schools are included within the statutory framework.
If services are not offered on-site and students must be transported to
alternate locations to receive them, districts must provide transportation (34
C.F.R. § 300.456(b)). At the same time, it is important to note that the cost of
transportation may be included in calculating the minimum amount of feder-
al funds that districts must spend on students in nonpublic schools. Further,
districts need not transport students between their homes and religious
schools as they must only do so between sites during the school day.
LIMITS ON FUNDING
According to the new regulations (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.458-300.462), IDEA
funds cannot be used to benefit private religiously affiliated schools in ways
that would violate the Establishment Clause. In other words, public funds
cannot be used to offer impermissible aid to religious institutions such as
financing existing instructional programs, otherwise providing them with
direct financial benefits in the form of money, or organizing classes based on
students' religions or schools they attend. Even so, the regulations allow dis-
tricts to employ public school personnel in nonpublic schools as long as they
are not supplanting services that are normally provided by those institutions.
The regulations further permit districts to hire personnel from nonpublic
schools to provide services outside of their regular hours of work as long as
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they are under the supervision and control of officials from the public
schools. Finally, equipment purchased with IDEA funds can only be used on-
site in nonpublic schools for the benefit of students with disabilities.
LITIGATION INVOLVING STUDENTS
IN NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS
As often as the IDEA has been litigated, it is surprising that so few of the
cases deal with the delivery of special education for students whose parents
voluntarily enrolled them in nonpublic schools. Moreover, as might have
been anticipated, since approximately 85% of students in nonpublic schools
attend religiously affiliated schools (National Center for Educational
Statistics, 1997), most of the litigation has centered on questions involving
the Establishment Clause. Even though the recent statutory changes address
many of the issues that were already litigated, a brief review of the pre-
amendment cases will set the stage for disputes directly involving the 1997
IDEA Amendments.
PRE-AMENDMENT LITIGATION
A major controversy that the 1997 IDEA Amendments seems to have
resolved is whether districts must provide special education on-site at a stu-
dent's nonpublic school. In Goodall v. Stafford County School Board (1991)
the Fourth Circuit held that a district in Virginia met its obligation under the
IDEA by offering such services at a local public school rather than the
Christian school that the student attended. Following Zobrest (1993), where-
in the Supreme Court permitted a student in a Catholic high school in
Arizona to receive the on-site delivery of the services of a sign language
interpreter, the Fourth Circuit affirmed its earlier judgment (Goodall v.
Stafford County School Board, 1995).
Four other courts agreed with Goodall {Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge,
1997; Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County 1996; K.R. v.
Anderson Community School Corporation, 1996; Tribble v. Montgomeiy,
1992). These courts generally ruled that districts met their obligations under
the IDEA when the necessary services were made available at public schools.
Yet, not all courts agreed as others interpreted the regulations as requiring
districts to provide students in nonpublic schools with services that were
comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those
offered to their peers in public schools (Fowler v. Unified School District.
1997; Natchez-Adams School District v. Searing, 1996; Peter v. Wedl, 1998;
Russman v. Sobol 1996). Insofar as three of these cases, K.R. v. Anderson
Community School Corporation, Russman v. Sobol, and Fowler v. Unified
School District, were appealed to the Supreme Court, they are discussed
below.
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Where districts do not provide services on-site, the question arose as to
whether they had to offer transportation to students between nonpublic
schools and the locations where they received services. Even though a regu-
lation (34 C.F.R. § 300.456(b)) specifically addresses this question by declar-
ing that transportation must be provided if students need it to benefit from or
participate in the special education programs, litigation ensued.
In Felter v. Cape Girardeau School District (1993), a federal trial court
in Missouri reasoned that the district had to provide transportation for a stu-
dent with visual and mobility impairments from the sidewalk in front of her
religiously affiliated nonpublic school to the public school where she attend-
ed special education classes; the court identified the child's school as St.
Mary's Cathedral School but did not identify its denominational affiliation.
Conversely, in Donald B. v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County (1997), a judgment that was issued shortly after the passage of the
1997 IDEA Amendments, but which involved a situation that occurred before
its enactment, the Eleventh Circuit found that a district in Alabama was not
required to transport a student who attended an Episcopalian school to a pub-
lic school for speech therapy. Although acknowledging that transportation
was a related service, the court concluded that it was unnecessary since the
student could walk safely from one school site to the other. These cases can
be reconciled because in Donald B. the student was able to access services
without transportation while in Felter the child's disabilities prevented her
from taking advantage of the services without transportation between sites.
POST-AMENDMENT LITIGATION
As appeals in K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corporation, Russman v.
Sobol, and Fowler v. Unified School District were pending before the
Supreme Court, Congress passed the 1997 IDEA Amendments.
Subsequently, the Court vacated and remanded these cases for reconsidera-
tion in light of the Amendments. On remand, the courts had to determine
what the districts had to do both before and after the 1997 IDEA
Amendments went into effect because even though the suits arose before the
changes were passed, the students continued to need special education.
In K.R. V. Anderson Community School Corporation (1996), the Seventh
Circuit originally denied the request of a student from Indiana for an instruc-
tional aide on-site in her Catholic school. On remand in K.R. v. Anderson
Community School Corporation (1997), the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the
1997 IDEA Amendments did not require states and districts to spend their
money to ensure that students with disabilities who attend nonpublic schools
would receive publicly funded special education comparable with what is
offered to children in public schools. Similarly, a federal trial court in
Wisconsin, citing Anderson, asserted that a hearing-impaired student whose
parents enrolled him in a Christian school was not entitled to the services of
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a sign language interpreter {Nieuwenhids v. Delavan-Darien School District
Board of Education, 1998). In positing that the 1997 IDEA Amendments
confirmed that an interpreter did not have to be provided on-site in the reli-
gious school, the court wrote that the district complied with the Act by offer-
ing a free appropriate public education at a public school. The court was of
the view that when the parents rejected the public school placement which
offered an appropriate education, they elected a lesser entitlement for their
son.
In a case that was resolved before the enactment of the IDEA
Amendments, the Tenth Circuit, in Fowler v. Unified School District (\991 a),
indicated that a district was not required to provide a sign language inter-
preter on-site at a private nonsectarian school if doing so cost more than
delivering a similar service at a public school. On remand, the Tenth Circuit
(Fowler v. Unified School District, 1997c) wrote that since the 1997 IDEA
Amendments were not applicable retroactively, its original holding stood
with respect to events that took place before the Amendments went into effect
on June 4, 1997. Conversely, as to actions after June 4, 1997, the court
explained that the district's sole obligation was to spend a proportionate
amount of federal funds on students in nonpublic schools. The court
remarked that the Amendments pointed out that states and districts were not
obligated to spend their own funds to provide special education for children
whose parents voluntarily enrolled them in nonpublic schools. The court
added that districts were not required to pay the educational costs of such stu-
dents who were offered a free appropriate public education. Rather, the court
was satisfied that districts merely had to make a proportionate amount of fed-
eral funds available to pay for the education of children who attended non-
public schools.
In Russman v. Sobol (1996), the Second Circuit initially declared that if
delivering special education services at a Roman Catholic school entailed
significant additional costs, a district in New York complied with the IDEA
by offering them at a local public school. On remand under the name of
Russman v. Mills (1997), the court agreed that the 1997 IDEA Amendments
did not require school districts to spend their own funds on students with dis-
abilities whose parents voluntarily enrolled in nonpublic schools. Instead, the
court believed that districts were only required to offer services that can be
paid for with a proportionate amount of the federal IDEA funds. Further, the
court acknowledged that the IDEA does not obligate districts to deliver on-
site services to students with disabilities whose parents voluntarily enrolled
them in nonpublic schools since the language of the Act is permissive rather
than mandatory.
In Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (1997a), the Fifth
Circuit initially was of the opinion that a hearing-impaired student in a
Catholic school in Louisiana was entitled to the on-site delivery of the assis-
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tance of a speech language interpreter if he could demonstrate that he had a
genuine need for such aid. However, after withdrawing its original opinion in
light of the passage of the 1997 IDEA Amendments (Cefalu v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board, 1997b), the court reversed itself and held that
the board was not required to fumish the student with an interpreter since he
rejected its offer of a free appropriate public education at public school.
Shortly after the 1997 IDEA Amendments went into effect, the Eighth
Circuit upheld its pre-amendment decision in Foley v. Special School District
of St. Louis County^ (1998) but relied on the revised version of the law since
a child and her parents sought prospective relief The trial court originally
held that the student in Missouri was not entitled to on-site delivery of spe-
cial education services in her Catholic school because the district met its
obligation by offering them at a public school. In affirming, the Eighth
Circuit stated that under the amended statute, the student did not have an
individual right to receive special education at a particular location.
In a second case from the Eighth Circuit, Peter v. Wedl (1998), the court
ruled that a child in a Christian school in Minnesota did not have a right to
the on-site delivery of services by a full-time paraprofessional. However,
since the district had a long-standing policy and practice of providing ser-
vices to students with disabilities at nonreligious, nonpublic, and home
schools, the court decreed that the denial of similar services to a student in a
religious school amounted to religious discrimination. The court also rea-
soned that under Agostini, the district lacked a valid argument that it risked
violating the Establishment Clause by delivering special education at the reli-
gious school. On remand under the name Westendorp v. Independent School
District No. 273 (1998), a federal trial court acknowledged that since the dis-
trict violated the pre-amendment version of the IDEA by refusing to provide
the child with the services he needed unless he attended a public school, he
was entitled to prospective relief In other words, the court concluded that
since the district violated the child's rights under the IDEA, it was required
to provide him with the services of a full-time paraprofessional for the next
six years regardless of where he attends school.
Finally, a suit from Louisiana, based in part on state law, has the poten-
tial to have a significant impact on the delivery of special education and other
federally funded programs in Catholic schools. In the part of the case most
relevant to special education, the Fifth Circuit, in Helms v. Picard (1998)
reversed a trial court mling. Helms v. Cody (1994), and upheld a state law that
permitted the on-site delivery of special education services to children who
attended Catholic schools. Insofar as there have been no changes in the mem-
bership of the Supreme Court since it reached its decision in Agostini
(Osbome & Russo, 1997; Russo & Osbome, 1997), it is likely that the
Louisiana statute will survive judicial scmtiny. In another part of the case
with the potential to affect the delivery of special education in Catholic
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schools, the Fifth Circuit struck down Chapter 2, now Title VI, of Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1998), a far-reaching federal
statute which permits the loan of state-owned instructional materials such as
computers, slide projectors, television sets, tape recorders, maps, and globes
to nonpublic schools. The court decided that the law was unconstitutional
because it had the impermissible effect of providing direct and substantial
assistance to religiously affiliated schools. In agreeing to hear an appeal in
the case, now Mitchell v. Helms (1999), the Supreme Court is likely to
resolve these questions of vital importance to Catholic schools.
ISSUES IN NEED OF FURTHER CLARIFICATION
As significant as the litigation surrounding the IDEA has been, there are at
least four important issues in need of further clarification about the delivery
of special education for children in Catholic schools: whether services must
be provided to all students whose parents voluntarily enroll them in religious
schools; whether public school officials have discretion over where and how
services are delivered; whether districts must offer services to children
whose parents voluntarily enroll them in religious schools; and whether there
are specific safeguards that public school administrators must put in place
pursuant to the delivery of special education services to children in religious
schools. The final section of this article reviews these important issues.
CHILDREN VOLUNTARILY ENROLLED
IN NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS
The IDEA does not direct districts to serve all children in nonpublic schools.
Rather, the IDEA requires districts to spend a proportionate share of their
federal funds on students who are enrolled in nonpublic schools. As long as
districts spend the minimum amount of federal funds on these pupils, they
will have met their obligations under the IDEA, even if all eligible children
are not served. Accordingly, it is conceivable that districts could serve some
but not all of these students. For example, districts could choose to serve
only students with mild to moderate disabilities in the more common cate-
gories but not those with low-incidence disabilities. Thus, districts can spend
all of their proportionate share of federal funds on a select group of children
in nonpublic schools and none on the rest of the students. Alternatively, dis-
tricts may provide services to all students with disabilities who attend non-
public schools but each would receive only a proportionate share of services.
In the latter case, the share of services that children in nonpublic schools
would receive is likely to be much less than that of similarly situated students
in public schools. However, it should be noted that the IDEA does require
districts to locate and identify students with disabilities who are attending
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nonpublic schools.
DELIVERY OF SERVICES
The regulations grant public school officials a great deal of latitude over
where and how special education services are offered to children in nonpub-
lic schools. Although the 1997 IDEA Amendments incorporated Agostini v.
Felton's holding that allows public school districts to provide the on-site
delivery of certain federally funded services at religiously affiliated nonpub-
lic schools, the Act does not mandate such delivery. The latitude that educa-
tors have over the delivery of services presumably includes the location
where they are offered. Even so, as noted, before acting, public school offi-
cials must consult with representatives from the nonpublic schools and give
them the opportunity to express their views.
Case law supports the notion that school systems satisfy the IDEA once
they offer students with disabilities a free appropriate public education.
Consequently, if parents reject the services offered at public schools, districts
are under no obligation to deliver them in nonpublic schools. The fact that an
individual right to services does not exist is found in the regulation (34
C.F.R.§ 300.457(a)) that the due process provisions of the IDEA are unavail-
able to students in nonpublic schools. The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Fowler
asserted that all districts simply had to make a proportionate share of federal
funds available to students in nonpublic schools.
In choosing where and how special education services are provided to
pupils in nonpublic schools, administrators must make sure that they do not
discriminate against a particular class of nonpublic school students. In other
words, as in Peter v. Wedl, educators cannot refuse to provide on-site services
to children in religious schools while offering them to peers in nonsectarian
institutions.
Where a school system does not offer the on-site delivery of services, and
children from nonpublic schools must travel to other locations, districts may
be required to provide transportation. Insofar as transportation is a related
service under the IDEA, districts must provide it where it is necessary for stu-
dents to benefit from special education (IDEA § 1401(22)). As such, districts
may have to provide transportation between sites when students need it in
order to access related services. Courts have held that transportation is nec-
essary if students' disabilities require it but can be dispensed with if students
can safely access services without being transported.
NATURE OF THE SERVICES AVAILABLE
TO CHILDREN IN NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS
The IDEA and its regulations make it clear that students who attend nonpub-
lic schools do not have the right to the same level of services that they would
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have received had they been in public schools. In fact, consistent with both
Anderson and Cefalii, since individual students do not even have the right to
receive any services at all, districts are under no obligation to provide any
particular level of services.
Districts that offer services to students in nonpublic schools need not
spend more on them than on children in public schools for similar services.
In fact, students in nonpublic schools can receive lesser services than simi-
larly situated peers in public schools if the cost of delivery to the former is
greater than the cost of delivering the same to the latter. The regulations sup-
port this interpretation in stating that individual students in nonpublic schools
do not have the right to the same level of services that they would have
received in public schools. At the same time, both the IDEA and the regula-
tions declare that districts may pay for services for pupils in nonpublic
schools only up to an amount equal to the federal funds that they would have
spent on them if they were enrolled in public schools. As such, if districts
offer services to students with disabilities in nonpublic schools, they may
provide only a level of services to each student that can be paid for with the
proportionate share of federal funds. The net result is that in such a situation,
each student would be likely to receive a bare minimum of services.
The regulations dictate that districts providing services to individual stu-
dents must employ personnel who meet the same certification standards as
their counterparts in the public schools. The regulations add that students in
nonpublic schools do not have the rights to receive the same amount of ser-
vices as their peers in the public schools. Consequently it seems that districts
may limit the kind and extent of the services they offer, but once provided,
services must be of comparable quality.
SAFEGUARDS IN DELIVERING SPECIAL EDUCATION
SERVICES IN RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Agiiilar v. Felton declared that the
New York City Board of Education (NYCBOE) violated the Establishment
Clause by allowing teachers and counselors paid with Title I funds to enter
religiously affiliated nonpublic schools, mostly Roman Catholic schools and
Hebrew Day Academies, to provide services to students. The Court struck the
practice down even though the NYCBOE had controls in place to avoid
excessive entanglement between educators in the public and nonpublic
schools. Twelve years later, the Court took the extraordinary step of express-
ly repudiating Agtiilar in Agostini v. Felton (1997).
In Agostini the Court found that the NYCBOE (and, by extension, other
districts) could, if they wished, but were not required to, provide Title I
(1997) services on-site in religious schools. Based in large part on the fact
that the NYCBOE spent over $100 million on computer-aided instruction,
leasing sites and mobile instructional units, and transporting students to those
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locations since 1986 (Agostini, 1997), the Court agreed that since appropri-
ate procedures were in place, the funds would have been better spent educat-
ing students.
The guidelines adopted by the NYCBOE in Agostini are relevant to spe-
cial educators for two important reasons. First, since both the IDEA and Title
I are federal laws, they are likely to be interpreted in similar fashions.
Second, the last of the 25 questions in a memorandum issued by Secretary of
Education Richard W. Riley and the Department of Education (1997) short-
ly after Agostini was resolved indicates that it applies to federal programs
other than Title I. According to the Department of Education:
Question 25: Does the Supreme Court's decision in Agostini apply to other
Federal education programs?
Answer: The Supreme Court's decision dealt directly with the issue of the
constitutionality of providing instructional services under Title I, Part A
programs in private schools. However, the implication of the Court's ruling
is that there is no constitutional bar to public school employees providing
educational services in private schools under other Federal programs under
similar circumstances.
To the extent that many, but not all, of the safeguards that the NYCBOE used
are incorporated in the memorandum from the Department of Education, they
should be instructive in developing programs providing the on-site delivery
of special education to students who attend religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools.
The NYCBOE instituted safeguards for its personnel who worked in reli-
gious schools under Title I. First, only staff who volunteered to do so were
eligible to serve as Title I personnel in religious schools. Second, assign-
ments were made without regard to the religious affiliations of the public
employees, most of whom worked in schools not of their own faiths. Third,
Title I staff were supervised by field personnel from the NYCBOE who made
frequent unannounced visits on at least a monthly basis. Fourth, all religious
symbols were removed from the classrooms and offices used in Title I pro-
grams. Fifth, as itinerants, most Title I staff ordinarily did not spend a full
week in one location. Sixth, the Title I personnel were told to limit their dis-
cussions with classroom teachers and other staff in the religious schools to
matters on mutual concerns over the education of the Title I students.
Consistent with the tripartite test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the leading case on matters involving the law and
public education in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. Title I personnel
were also given detailed instructions highlighting the secular nature and pur-
pose of that law while explaining the importance of avoiding excessive entan-
glement. First, staff were reminded that, as public school employees, they
were responsible only to their own supervisors. Second, public employees
388 Catholic Education/March 2000
were told that they could instmct only students who were approved by their
supervisors. Third, staff were warned not to engage in team teaching or other
cooperative instructional methodologies with personnel from the religious
schools. Fourth, public employees were forbidden from introducing any reli-
gious materials in their classrooms and work areas. Fifth, staff were told to
avoid involvement in religious activities at the schools where they worked.
Finally, public employees were reminded that all materials and equipment
purchased with Title I funds were to be used solely in that program; in light
of Mitchell v. Helms (1999), it will be interesting to see how the Court inter-
prets Chapter 2, now Title VI, of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (1999) with regard to the use of such materials.
To the extent that public school systems offer the on-site delivery of spe-
cial education for students with disabilities who attend religious schools, then
the closer their policies conform to the safeguards initiated by the NYCBOE
and the memorandum from the Department of Education, the more likely that
they will be to survive a legal challenge.
CONCLUSION
Recent statutory, regulatory, and judicial actions addressing the delivery of
special education in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools have left children
in Catholic schools with the proverbial half of a loaf of bread. That is, while
the law makes it clear that students in Catholic schools are entitled to special
education, the funding restrictions may actually limit the amount of services
that they receive. Moreover, even though it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will invalidate the Louisiana law in Mitchell v. Helms (1999) that permits the
on-site delivery of special education in Catholic schools, this case, like so
many other areas of the law, bears watching as it has the potential to have a
significant impact on American Catholic schools.
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